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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF NON-
UNIQUE STANDING TIMBER FOR IMMEDIATE SEVERANCE
It is the purpose of this note to determine the common law rule
as to specific enforcement of contracts for the sale of non-unique
standing timber to be severed immediately, and the effect of the
Uniform Sales Act and other pertinent statutes thereupon. For the
purpose of brevity, the writer will not use the phrase "non-unique
standing timber for immediate severance" in every instance, but
will merely use the word "timber" to suffice for the entire phrase.
At common law much controversy arose as to whether the
timber, under the contract of sale, was realty or personalty since
this was the primary problem to be decided before specific per-
formance could be decreed. The necessity for such a decision came
from the firmly established rule of equity that land is considered
to be unique and contracts for the sale of land are specifically en-
forced because damages at law are inadequate. However personalty,
unless proven otherwise, is not unique, and specific performance is
denied since there is an adequate remedy at law.' Therefore, if
the timber was an interest in land, specific performance could be
decreed; but if the timber was personalty, specific performance
would not be granted.
As one court has said, "The question has been differently de-
cided in different jurisdictions, and by different courts, or at dif-
ferent times by the same court within the same jurisdiction." - The
majority rule at common law seemed to be that a sale of standing
timber was a sale of an interest in land.3 In reaching this result, the
courts reasoned that the legal character of timber is realty since it
is not subject to levy and sale as chattel property upon execution,
it descends with the land to the heir, and it passes to the vendee
with the soil. The minority based their holding that such timber was
personalty upon the reasoning that since severance was a condition
of the sale, it was clearly the intent of the parties that the timber
be considered as personalty. " Other cases, distinguishing between
contracts calling for immediate severance and those allowing the
timber to stand for a longer period of time, held that only if im-
mediate severance was contemplated, was the sale one of chattels
14 POMEROY, EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) sec. 1402.
"Hirth v. Graham, 50 Ohio St. 57, 33 N.E. 90, 91 (1893).
'Hirth v. Graham, 50 Ohio St. 57, 33 N.E. 90, 91 (1893) also see
Note (1908) 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 278 for collected authorities.
4Banton v. Shorey, 77 Me. 48, 51-52 (1885); Leonard v. Medford,
85 MId. 666, 37 Atl. 365, 367 (1897), see White v. Foster, 102 Mass.
375, 378 (1869).
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since, if the timber remained, it received growth and support from
the soil.0
However, in 1906, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Sales Act which has subsequently been
adopted by many jurisdictions. This Act contained two sections di-
rectly in point on the subject. The first is Section 76 which appears
in Kentucky as Kentucky Revised Statutes 361.760 and which pro-
vides that the term "goods" includes " things attached to or form-
ing part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or
under the contract of sale." Seemingly this should have put an end to
the common law controversy as to whether such a sale was one of
realty or personalty in those jurisdictions adopting the act, as the only
logical interpretation of this provision is that standing timber which
is to be severed under a contract of sale is personalty. Williston
reaches this same conclusion, pointing out that the American Sales
Act is based on the English Sale of Goods Act, which was a codifica-
tion of the English common law; and that this provision "copying as
it has, the definition of 'Goods' from the English statute, has
adopted the English rule that any growing object attached to the soil
is to be treated as goods, if by the terms of the contract it is to be
inmediately severed."'
Yet among the few cases construing this section in its relation
to the sale of timber, varying results are reached. Wisconsin, some
ten years after it had adopted the Uniform Sales Act, held that a con-
tract for the sale of standing timber relates to an interest in land,
the act not being discussed by the court.' However,\m a recent case
in Oregon," the plaintiff argued that the timber in the suit must be
regarded as personal property under the Uniform Sales Act which
had been adopted in that state. After a review of the cases, the court
decided that "standing timber is deemed to be goods when and only
when it is agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of
sale" but as the contract in the suit did not contain any agreement
as to severance, the act did not apply. These two cases and certain
cases cited therein are the only decisions this writer has found con-
struing this section of the Sales Act as it applies to timber.
The second section of the Uniform Sales Act concerning this
subject is Section 68, or Kentucky Revised Statutes 361.680. It pro-
vides that:
"Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific
or ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of
equity may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by its
Dils v Hatcher, 24 Ky L. Rep. 826, 69 S.W 1092 (1902)
Byassee v. Reese, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 334 (1863) Cain v. McGuire, 52
Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 274 (1852).
0 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) sec. 62.
"Schaap v. Wolf, 173 Wis. 951, 181 N.W 214 (1921).
'Reid v. Kier, 175 Ore. 192, 152 P 2d 417 (1944).
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be performed
specifically "
This section could put an end to the common law controversy as to
whether the contract for the sale of timber should be specifically
enforced, for it allows those minority jurisdictions which heretofore
considered the timber as personalty and therefore did not grant
specific performance to allow such a remedy in the Chancellor's dis-
cretion. It may be argued, on one hand, that the adoption of this
section of the Uniform Sales Act enlarged the jurisdiction of courts
of equity to permit specific performance of contracts for the sale of
personalty, since such a remedy is possible in the Chancellor's dis-
cretion.' On the other hand, it is possible to say that although the
section does give the Chancellor an opportunity to decree specific
performance in his discretion, he does not have to do so unless such
is his desire, and consequently a Chancellor will ordinarily not do so
in those jurisdictions which denied specific performance of contracts
concerning personalty before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act-
Illinois has followed this line of reasoning" It would appear that
the first view is by far the more preferable one. Williston is in
accord with this conclusion, for in discussing Section 68 he has said,
"This section will perhaps dispose courts to enlarge somewhat
the number of cases, where specific performance is allowed." I No
case has been found by this writer which applies this section to a
contract for the sale of timber but it is submitted that it is and
should be construed to be an enlargement of the jurisdiction of the
courts of equity.
The remaining statute to be discussed in this note is not a sec-
tion of the Uniform Sales Act but is Kentucky Revsed Statute
371.100 which provides that:
'"o contract for the sale of standing trees or stand-
ing timber shall be enforceable by action unless the
contract or some memorandum thereof is in writing,
signed by the person to be charged or by his duly
- authorized agent."
In fact, the relation of this statute to the subject of this note is
of minor importance and the reason for its discussion is to clear
away any confusion which might exist when the two are considered
together. The statute seemingly relates to realty as it is suggestive of
the Statute of Frauds in that the contract must be in writing, but it
is to be noted that while one section of the Statute of Frauds relates
to realty,' it is also true that another section applies to personalty.'
Thus no logical connotation of realty alone should necessarily result
'Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114 (1917).
"G. C. Outten Grain Co. v. Grace, 2?9 Ill. App. 284 (1925).
"2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 1508.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) 371.010 (6)
"'Ky.'R. S. (1946) 361.040.
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from a consideration of this Kentucky statute. Its effect is simply to
provide that contracts for the sale of standing timber must be in
writing. There is nothing in the statute in conflict with the section in
the Sales Act which provides that such contracts concern personalty.
To harmonize the two, contracts for the sale of standing timber for
immediate severance in Kentucky concern personalty but they must
be in writing.
It is submitted that in those jurisdictions which have adopted
the Uniform Sales Act, a contract for the sale of non-unique stand-
ing timber for immediate severance is a contract for the sale of per-
sonalty and that specific performance may be granted by a court of
equity in its discretion. The statute changes the common law major-
ity rule which regarded such timber as realty and a decree of specific
performance now rests upon the discretion of the Chancellor in each
case. JonN I. IAnum
